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Violence comes in many forms and occurs in many different circumstances for many different reasons. Is it really possible to develop a single theory that 
can explain all these disparate acts? In this paper, we argue it is. We make the case that acts of violence are essentially moral actions and therefore can, 
and should, be analysed and explained as such. We maintain that all acts of violence can be explained within the general framework of a theory of moral 
action. We present just such a theory – Situational Action Theory – and demonstrate how it can be applied to the explanation and study of violence.
Violence as Situational Action
Per-Olof H. Wikström, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
Kyle H. Treiber, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
People get into bar !ghts because someone spills beer on 
them. Police o"cers beat up suspects who insult them. 
Terrorists blow up planes and vehicles to achieve political 
goals. Mothers hit their children because they misbehave. 
Youth gangs attack members of other gangs to defend 
their turf. Soldiers shoot enemies to stop them advancing. 
Husbands hit their spouses because they disagree about 
family !nances. State o"cials execute o#enders as a form 
of punishment. Adolescents get into schoolyard !ghts over 
rude remarks. Drug-dealers kill rivals to protect their busi-
nesses. Disgruntled employees go on shooting sprees in 
their workplaces because they are made redundant.
Violence comes in many forms and occurs in many di#er-
ent circumstances (see McClintock 1963; McClintock and 
Wikström 1992; Wikström 1985, 1991) for many di#erent 
reasons (see Curtis 1974; Wolfgang 1958). Is it really possible 
to develop a single theory that can explain all these dispa-
rate acts? We will argue it is.
In this paper we will make the case that acts of violence are 
essentially moral actions and therefore can, and should, be 
analysed and explained as such.1 We will maintain that all 
acts of violence can be explained within the general frame-
work of a theory of moral action. We will present just such 
a theory – Situational Action !eory (e.g., Wikström 2006, 
forthcoming) – and demonstrate how it can be applied to 
the explanation and study of violence.2
1. Situational Action Theory
Situational Action .eory (SAT) was originally devel-
oped to overcome key problems identi!ed in prominent 
criminological theories (Wikström 2004, 2005), including 
the problem of the de!nition of crime (theories are o/en 
unclear about what it is they aim to explain); the problem 
1 Morality is o/en discussed in terms of whether 
particular actions are good or bad (virtuous or 
reprehensible), or whether or not they are justi-
!ed in relation to some superior moral principle. 
It is important to stress that we do not use and 
discuss morality in these terms but rather focus on 
understanding how people’s actions are guided by 
rules about what actions are right or wrong under 
particular circumstances; we classify these rules 
as moral rules. We do not make any judgements 
about whether existing rules are justi!ed or not. 
Consequently, we also avoid terminology like 
“inappropriate”, “antisocial” or “immoral”. Our 
aim here is to explore how human action is guided 
by moral rules, not why we have the moral rules 
we have. We recognise that this is a very important 
question, but not one we address in this paper.
2 SAT has already been applied to other 
forms of moral action, including acts of ter-
rorism (Bouhana and Wikström 2008).
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of distinguishing between causes and correlates and the 
consequently poor understanding of causal mechanisms 
(theories o/en fail to distinguish between attributes and 
markers and actual causes because they lack an accurate 
understanding of relevant causal processes); the problem 
of integrating levels of explanation (theories o/en lack 
a proper theory of action through which individual and 
environmental levels of explanation can be integrated);3 
and the problem of explaining development and change 
(theories o/en fail to adequately explain relevant processes 
of development and change).4
Subsequently, SAT has developed into a more general 
theory of moral action which aims to explain why people 
follow and break moral rules, in which crime is regarded as 
a subclass of a more general category of acts of moral rule-
breaking (Wikström 2006, forthcoming; Wikström and 
Treiber 2009). .e chief rationale for expanding the scope 
of the theory is that there is no fundamental di#erence be-
tween explaining why people (follow or) break moral rules 
in general (for example, informal rules about talking in a 
library, drinking alcohol before noon or skipping ahead in 
a queue) and why they (follow or) break moral rules de"ned 
by law. .e basic causal processes are the same; hence the 
basic explanation is the same.
1.1. A Brief Summary of the Foundations and Key Propositions of SAT
Situational Action .eory aims to overcome the endur-
ing (but unfruitful) divide between individual and envi-
ronmental explanations of moral action, such as acts of 
violence. It achieves this by proposing a situational mecha-
nism (a perception–choice process), which links a person 
and his/her environment to his/her action. It postulates that 
all actions (including acts of crime and violence) may be 
seen as the outcome of (i) what action alternatives a person 
perceives, and (ii) what action choices he/she then makes.
Situational Action .eory is based on explicit assumptions 
about human nature and its relation to social order. Hu-
mans are viewed as essentially rule-guided actors and social 
order as fundamentally based on adherence to common 
rules of conduct (i.e., the social order is essentially a moral 
order). Explaining human moral action such as acts of vio-
lence ultimately has to do with understanding the interplay 
between common moral rules of conduct and a person’s 
own moral rules in shaping his/her moral development and 
providing grounds for his/her moral actions.
SAT also aims to reconcile the role of deterministic and 
voluntaristic forces in the explanation of human action. 
SAT integrates deterministic approaches (behaviouristic) 
and voluntaristic approaches (free will) to the explanation 
of moral action and crime. It does so by recognizing that 
human action (including law abidance and acts of crime) 
may be caused either by habit or more rational delibera-
tion. It argues that people exercise free will and self-control 
(internal controls) and respond to deterrence cues (exter-
nal controls) only when they deliberate. Whether a choice 
of action is deliberate or habitual depends on the actor’s 
familiarity with the circumstances in which he/she oper-
ates; repeated exposure to particular circumstances leads to 
action becoming automated (habitual), rather than deliber-
ate, in those and similar circumstances (Wikström 2006, 
forthcoming; Wikström and Treiber 2009).
.e fundamental arguments of Situational Action .eory 
concerning the explanation of violence are (Wikström 
forthcoming):
i. Acts of violence are moral actions (i.e., actions guided 
by what it is right or wrong to do, or not to do, in a par-
ticular circumstance) and therefore need to be explained 
as such.
ii. People engage in acts of violence because they (i) come 
to see such acts as viable action alternatives and (ii) 
choose (habitually or deliberately) to carry them out.
3 .e perspective we propose is neither indi-
vidualistic nor collectivistic, but situational; 
rather than explaining how individual or 
environmental factors lead to action, it focuses 
on how their interaction leads to action.
4 Not all criminological theories fail on all 
these fronts, but we argue that the vast major-
ity fail on at least one, and o/en several.
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iii. The likelihood that a person will come to see an act of 
violence as an action alternative and choose to carry it 
out ultimately depends on his/her propensity to engage 
in violence (grounded in his/her action-relevant moral 
rules and emotions and ability to exercise self-control) 
and its interplay with his/her exposure to settings 
conducive to violence (defined by their action-relevant 
moral rules and level of enforcement).
iv. The role of broader social conditions and their changes 
(such as social integration and segregation), and the role 
of individual development and change (life histories), 
should be analysed as the causes of the causes of acts of 
violence.
v. Relevant causes of the causes of acts of violence are 
only those social conditions and life events that can be 
demonstrated to influence the development of people’s 
propensity to engage in acts of violence (their action-
relevant morality and ability to exercise self-control) 
and the emergence of, and people’s differential exposure 
to, settings with features pertinent to acts of violence 
(settings whose moral context and deterrent qualities 
may encourage or discourage violence).
1.2. De!ning Acts of Violence
Concepts like aggression and violence are used and de!ned 
in many di#erent ways (e.g., Baron 1977; Brenner 1971; Buss 
1961; Cahoon 1972).5 We de!ne violence as acts intended to 
bring about physical harm to other beings. What we aim to 
explain, then, is a type of action. Acts are bodily movements 
under the guidance of a person (e.g., speaking or hitting). 
We only consider acts intended to cause harm, because ex-
cluding intention from the de!nition would mean accidents 
which (unintentionally) cause harm would classify as acts 
of violence (for example, accidentally shooting someone 
when cleaning a gun) while unsuccessful attempts to harm 
someone would not (for example, shooting to kill someone, 
but missing). We have also restricted the concept of violence 
to acts intended to bring about physical harm, that is, acts 
intended to cause pain, bodily injury or death. However, 
our explanation applies equally well to intentional acts 
which cause emotional harm (for example, verbal abuse) 
and material damage (vandalism).6
Harming another being can be a goal in itself (sometimes 
referred to as “expressive” violence) or a means to another 
goal (sometimes referred to as “instrumental” violence). 
SAT applies equally well to expressive or instrumental acts 
of violence, thus there is no need for separate explana-
tions. We will, however, discuss some of the di#erences in 
circumstances which lead to expressive and instrumental 
violence. 
.e intentions of the object of the violence are not part of our 
de!nition. Acts are regarded as violent regardless of wheth-
er the object of the intended harm explicitly or implicitly 
agrees to be subjected to pain or injury (for example, as they 
may in certain sports and sexual activities). .ere is no need 
to construct di#erent explanations for cases in which the 
victim does and does not agree to be subjected to physical 
harm. .ey can all be explained as moral actions.
1.3. Violence as Moral Action
When explaining acts of violence, the most important fact 
is not that they intend to bring about physical harm but 
that they are moral actions guided by rules about what it is 
right or wrong to do in a particular circumstance. .ere is 
principally no di#erence in explaining the causal processes 
that make a person hit someone, lie to someone or steal 
someone’s belongings. What di#ers are the moral rules that 
guide particular kinds of action (the action-relevant moral 
rules). What di#erentiates acts of violence from other moral 
actions is therefore not the basic processes which make 
people engage in violence (versus another moral action) 
but the input (action-relevant moral rules) which guides 
the perception of violence as an action alternative and the 
choice between violence and other alternatives in a particu-
lar circumstance. To fully understand why people engage in 
5 For example, aggression may  refer 
to a drive or a behaviour.
6 We regard violence as a subclass of the more 
inclusive concept of aggression, de!ned as acts 
intended to bring about harm to other beings. Ag-
gression so de!ned includes acts intended to cause 
physical as well as emotional harm (e.g., feelings of 
distress). We reserve the term vandalism for actions 
intended to damage or destroy others’ material 
possessions without the owner’s express permission.
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a particular kind of moral action, one needs to comprehend 
the particular moral rules which regulate that action.
Because violence takes many forms – one of the reasons it 
has proven di"cult to develop an e#ective general theory 
– there is considerable variation in the moral rules which 
regulate di#erent kinds of violence in di#erent settings. 
Moral rules regulate not only whether the use of violence is 
right or wrong in a particular circumstance, but also what 
kinds and levels of violence are permitted. For example, 
the use of violence in a boxing ring is permitted if boxing is 
legal, if the person hitting is a boxer, if the person being hit 
is his opponent, if that opponent is wearing the right equip-
ment, if the referee has indicated the match is underway, 
and so forth. What is common to all cases of violence is the 
fact that there are always moral rules guiding its use, and a 
particularly important form of moral rules which regulate 
violence is the law.
1.4. The Law as Moral Rules
.e use of violence is generally regulated by law. Violence is 
illegal in some circumstances, but far from all. .e circum-
stances in which violence is legal vary between countries 
and have changed within countries over the course of his-
tory. A good example is the use of violence in domestic cir-
cumstances (e.g., a husband’s right to use violence against 
his wife, a parent’s right to use violence against his/her child 
and a teacher’s right to use violence against his/her pupils).
Laws are rules of conduct that tell people what they are 
allowed or not allowed to do (Ehrlich 2008). Hence laws 
are moral rules. .ey are not the only set of moral rules in 
a given country, but are usually the most important (with 
the possible exception of religion in some countries).7 .ere 
are, of course, other sets of moral rules outside the law (and 
religion), which are more or less generalized, more or less 
formalised, and which guide people’s use of violence in dif-
ferent circumstances. .e law and other sets of moral rules 
may con0ict in the form and degree of violence they permit 
in particular circumstances. .e extent to which particular 
laws are e#ectively normative (homogeneously internalised) 
may vary within a jurisdiction. Changes in law can be used 
to try to change people’s moral rules (as a tool of social 
engineering). Criminalising the use of violence in domestic 
circumstances is a good example. .e fact that many special 
interest groups (such as environmentalists) campaign to 
have their agendas recognized by law is another good il-
lustration of the perceived power of the law (i.e., its rules of 
conduct) as a major force in0uencing human action. 
1.5. Moral Rules as Causal Powers
.e reason why moral rules are important in the explana-
tion of human action is that they have causal powers (pow-
ers to bring about certain actions).8 .ey in0uence people 
to act in certain ways. .ey in0uence people to see certain 
action alternatives and to make certain choices in response 
to particular circumstances. In fact, we would argue that 
moral rules are key causal powers in explaining moral ac-
tions such as acts of violence. One main reason why people 
engage in acts of violence is because moral rules allow them 
to see and choose violence as a viable action alternative 
in response to a particular circumstance. However, moral 
rules are not the only relevant causal powers in the expla-
nation of human actions such as violence. Another main 
kind of causal power a#ecting moral action is what may be 
referred to as controls.
1.6. The Role of Controls in Moral Action
We submit that it is analytically advantageous to conceptu-
ally distinguish “moral rules” and “controls” in the expla-
nation of moral action. Moral rules convey to people what 
actions are right or wrong in particular circumstances. 
People do not always follow moral rules. Controls kick in 
as an additional causal power when people deliberate over 
7 One of the essential elements of a religion 
is a code of conduct which applies to its ad-
herents (e.g., the Ten Commandments). .e 
overlap between legal and religious rules 
may be substantial in some jurisdictions.
8 .e idea that rules have the power to guide human 
action has been forcefully argued by Harré and 
Secord (1972, 12): “It is the self-monitored following 
of rules and plans that we believe to be the social 
science analogue of the working of generative causal 
mechanisms in the processes which produce the 
non-random patterns studied by natural scientists.” 
Durkheim (2002, 41) refers to rules as being what 
he calls “genuine forces” that in0uence human 
action: “.anks to the authority vested in them, 
moral rules are genuine forces, which confront 
our desires and needs, our appetites of all sorts, 
when they promise to become immoderate.”
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whether or not to follow a moral rule. We de!ne controls 
as “enforcements of moral rules”. .ey are processes that 
support adherence to moral rules, such as those regulat-
ing the use of violence. E#ective controls are enforcements 
that make people act in accordance with moral rules they 
consider breaking. .ese can be moral rules that promote 
or prohibit a moral action. Controls are only activated when 
people deliberate over action alternatives. Controls do not 
play a major role in habitual action in which the action is an 
“automated” response to a repeated exposure to the particu-
lar circumstance (see below and Wikström 2006).
.ere are two main types of enforcements of moral rules: 
those originating from inside the person (self-control) and 
those originating from outside the person (deterrence). Self-
control comes into play when there is a con0ict between 
a person’s motivation to act and his/her morality. For 
example, if a person is provoked by someone and motivated 
to hit him/her, but thinks and feels that hitting someone 
is wrong, the outcome will depend on the strength of the 
factors in0uencing the actor’s ability to exercise self-control. 
We de!ne self-control as “the inhibition of perceived action 
alternatives or the interruption of a course of action, which 
con0icts with the agent’s own morality” (Wikström and 
Treiber 2007). A person’s ability to exercise self-control will 
depend on factors such as his/her ability to process infor-
mation or suppress emotion, but also momentary in0uences 
such as his/her level of stress or intoxication (for further 
details see Wikström and Treiber 2007).
Deterrence is the main causal mechanism through which 
formal and informal social controls (external interventions) 
in0uence a person’s moral actions. Deterrence is de!ned as 
“the felt worry about or fear of consequences when consid-
ering breaking a moral rule or committing an act of crime” 
(for further details see Wikström 2007). Deterrence comes 
into play as a causal force when there is a con0ict between 
the moral rules that apply to a setting and a person’s own 
morality. For example, if a person has no problem hitting 
someone who makes a rude remark but the moral rules of 
the setting (e.g., laws) prohibit such an action, the outcome 
will depend on the strength of deterrence originating from 
the conditions of the setting (i.e., the perceived likelihood of 
e#ective intervention and seriousness of potential conse-
quences).
Controls are only relevant when there is a discrepancy or 
con0ict involving the application of moral rules. In cases 
where the person’s own morality and the moral rules of 
the setting tell him/her not to use violence, violence will be 
unlikely. On the other hand, in settings where the person’s 
morality and the moral rules of the setting tell him/her that 
violence is permitted, violence will be likely. In all other 
cases, the strength of the controls (self-control or deter-
rence) will play a role in whether violence is the outcome.
1.7. The Role of Motivation in Moral Action
Motivation (de!ned as goal-directed attention) is a situa-
tional concept. People have particular desires (wants, needs) 
and commitments and when they encounter an opportunity 
to ful!l a desire or honour a commitment they are likely 
to be tempted to do so (i.e., to focus their attention on the 
possibility of acting to satisfy a desire or honour a commit-
ment). Temptation may be regarded as one major class of 
motivators. 
People also face frictions (unwanted interferences) which, 
depending on a person’s sensitivity, may cause a provocation 
(feelings of upset or anger directed towards the perceived 
source of the friction).9 Interferences can be physical (e.g., 
standing in someone’s way) or verbal (e.g., insulting some-
one). Provocations may be regarded as another major class 
of motivators. 
Temptations and provocations may not be the only motiva-
tors, but they are some of the most, if not the most, impor-
9 Perhaps the most famous motivational theory of 
aggression is Dollard and colleagues’ frustration-
aggression hypothesis (1944), which claims that “ag-
gression is always a consequence of frustration” and 
“the existence of frustration always leads to some 
form of aggression” (1). In this theory, aggression is 
de!ned as “a sequence of behavior, the goal-response 
to which is injury to the person towards whom it 
is directed” (7) and frustration as “an interference 
with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response” 
(5). Although we accept that frustration may be a 
major motivator of violent action, we stress there 
are many others. We also prefer the concep-
tual pairing of frictions and provocations, which 
underlines the situational nature of motivation.
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tant classes of motivators in moral action. While tempta-
tions originate from within (being initiated when a person’s 
desires and commitments connect to an opportunity), 
provocations originate from without (being initiated by 
unwanted external interferences). Acts of violence may be 
motivated by temptations or provocations. A person may hit 
a stranger to obtain a CD he/she desires, a member of a rival 
gang to honour a commitment (not necessarily because he/
she wants to) or a peer who insults his/her partner (an inter-
ference). However, people may and commonly do use alter-
natives other than violence to deal with their motivations. 
.e crucial question is why some people respond violently 
to a motivation, while others do not.
.ere are no particular motivations that (always) cause 
people to act violently. People turn to violence for all sorts 
of motives (they may or may not use violence as part of 
dealing with particular desires, commitments or frictions). 
Motivation exerts a general directional in#uence on the 
kinds of action in which a person may engage. People vary 
in individual factors in0uencing their motivations (e.g., 
their particular desires and commitments and sensitivity 
to frictions) and therefore in the kinds of action in which 
they may be motivated to engage.
Whether or not a particular motivation results in an act 
of violence crucially depends on the interplay between a 
person’s morality and the moral rules of the setting, which 
acts as a moral "lter for the kinds of action he/she consid-
ers, and, when relevant (i.e., when a person deliberates 
over the application of moral rules to a choice of action), is 
in0uenced by the strength of the controls operating in the 
particular circumstance. Motivation is therefore a neces-
sary, but not su"cient, factor in the explanation of moral 
actions such as acts of violence.
1.8. Moral Choices
When a person is motivated (has goal-directed attention) 
he/she will, depending on the moral !lter, perceive certain 
action alternatives in relation to the motivation and, based 
upon that, make certain moral choices. .is perception–
choice process can be either (predominantly) habitual or 
deliberate. In a process characterized by moral habit, the 
person sees only one causally e#ective action alternative, 
while in a deliberate process, when the person makes a moral 
judgement, he/she has to decide which is the best of several 
perceived alternatives.
1.8.1. Moral Habits
Habitual action choices occur when people perceive only 
one alternative for action; the choice of action is then auto-
matic.10 .e actor does not exhibit free will or self-control 
because he/she allows the setting to determine the action 
by complying with the !rst alternative which that setting 
(or a factor in that setting) causes to “spring to mind” 
(Wikström 2006; Wikström and Treiber 2007).
Habits are acquired when a person learns to act in a par-
ticular way in a particular setting a/er being repeatedly 
exposed to that setting and responding to it with a partic-
ular action (which obtains a desire, ful!ls a commitment, 
or addresses a source of friction). .rough repetition that 
action may become prepotent, i.e., the !rst alternative he/
she perceives upon entering the setting, and subsequently 
habitual, the only alternative he/she perceives. 
Habits may be very speci!c or generalized. Just as perceiv-
ing an action as an alternative in one setting may increase 
the likelihood one will perceive it as an alternative in other 
settings, habitually choosing an alternative in one set-
ting may increase the likelihood that one may habitually 
choose that alternative in other settings as well (Hues-
mann 1997).
.e acquisition of habits is supported by the somatic 
marker system, by which the brain summates information 
about the somatic outcomes of each instance of an action 
into an intuitive “marker” which signi!es the action’s 
signi!cance (Damasio 1994, 1996). .is marker is activated 
by action-relevant contexts and helps to steer goal-directed 
10 Note that “doing x” and “not doing x” are 
two alternatives and therefore do not lead to an 
automatic choice. An automatic choice occurs 
when a person perceives the option of “do-
ing x” but not the option of “not doing x”.
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attention. Most of the information these markers convey 
is emotional. Emotions can bene!t perception by redirect-
ing attention to unremarkable action-relevant factors, or 
impair it by redirecting attention to action-irrelevant ones 
(Bechara, Tranel, and Damasio 2000; Damasio 1994, 1996; 
Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney 2002; Huesmann 1997; Lö-
sel and Schmucker 2004; Turnbull et al. 2005). Very strong 
emotions may lead an actor to see only one alternative and 
act habitually.
Although under-researched, habits have important implica-
tions, especially for our understanding of persistent pat-
terns of behaviour, such as how they arise, why they persist 
and, potentially, how they may be disrupted.
1.8.2. Moral Judgement
Moral judgements occur when actors deliberately consider 
more than one alternative for action. Deliberation involves 
gathering and analyzing information relevant to di#er-
ent alternatives, and using that information to determine 
which alternative is preferred (Fuster 1997; Goldman-Rakic 
1987). .is process is facilitated by areas of the brain which 
store, retrieve and manipulate sensory information from 
the environment and internalized knowledge (Adcock et al. 
2000; Best, Williams, and Coccaro 2002; Cohen et al. 1997; 
Prabhakaran et al. 2000; Schoenbaum and Setlow 2001; 
Smith and Jonides 1997). 
Deliberation allows people to internalize control of an 
action. Self-control is important for moral action because 
it allows people to act in accordance with their personal 
moral rules even when they are motivated to break them 
(Wikström and Treiber 2007). .is process is supported 
by brain areas which suppress emotions and habits and 
redirect attention from salient motivators (opportunities 
and sources of friction) to less salient deterrents (e.g., moral 
rules and consequences) (Best, Williams, and Coccaro 
2002; Nobre et al. 1999).
Although the ability to exercise self-control is in0uenced by 
relatively stable personal characteristics (executive capa-
bilities), it is also susceptible to transient in0uences, such 
as intoxication, emotional volatility and levels of stress 
(Wikström and Treiber 2007). .us it is not a material or 
personal factor, but a situational factor which characterizes 
a person’s engagement with a particular setting – i.e., an 
action process.
Self-control requires something to control, and therefore 
will only play a role in action processes in which the ac-
tor deliberates because he/she perceives con0ict between 
his/her (externally driven) motivation to act and his/her 
personal moral rules. His/her ability to exercise self-control 
will determine if he/she successfully controls the action and 
acts in accordance with those rules.
1.8.3. Real-life Moral Choices
Although most choices are predominantly habitual or 
deliberative, many choice processes may involve elements of 
both habituation and deliberation (Damasio 1994; Kahne-
man 2003; Sloman 1996). To understand action, and how 
to prevent certain kinds of action, we need to understand 
these disparate types of choice and what kinds of actions 
they help explain. 
2. Applying Situational Action Theory to Violence
We have argued that the Situational Action .eory provides 
a framework for explaining all acts of violence because acts 
of violence represent a type of moral action guided by rules 
about intentionally harming others, and all moral actions 
can be explained by understanding why certain people per-
ceive those actions as alternatives they choose to pursue (the 
perception–choice process). Di#erent types of moral action 
will di#er, however, in the content which feeds this process. 
.at content includes the moral context (action-relevant 
moral rules and their enforcement in the setting) and the 
actor’s personal morality (internalized action-relevant mor-
al rules and emotions) and ability to exercise self-control. 
Acts of violence di#er from other types of moral action 
because they occur when people with weak personal moral 
rules and emotions opposing the intentional harming of 
others (people who do not think intentionally harming oth-
ers is wrong in a given circumstance, or do not care much 
about doing so even if they think it is), or strong personal 
moral rules and emotions supporting the intentional harm-
ing of others (people who think intentionally harming 
others is the right thing to do in a given circumstance and 
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would feel justi!ed in doing so) encounter opportunities or 
frictions which may tempt or provoke them to act violently 
in settings which have a violence-conducive moral context 
(settings in which rules promote violence or in which rules 
prohibiting violence are weakly enforced). .e intersection 
of such people and such settings may lead those people to 
perceive intentionally harming others as an alternative (and 
possibly the only alternative) which they choose to pursue.
In the following sections, we will discuss in detail the con-
tent which distinguishes violence as a moral action and the 
unique implications for its explanation and prevention. We 
will also consider the content which distinguishes di#erent 
types of violence, particularly instrumental and expressive 
violence, which are o/en treated as separate categories of 
action. We will conclude by discussing the antecedent fac-
tors (the causes of the causes) which in0uence the acquisi-
tion of and changes in personal characteristics conducive to 
violence (relevant personal moral rules and emotions and 
the ability to exercise self-control) and the emergence of and 
changes in settings conducive to violence (relevant moral 
contexts) (Wikström 2005; Wikström and Treiber 2009). In 
doing so, it is our intention to show how violence, which is 
o/en treated as a special class of action requiring a special 
explanation, is explicable within the framework of Situ-
ational Action .eory, like any other moral action.
2.1. Perception of Violence as an Alternative
Most explanations of action focus on how people choose 
amongst (predetermined) alternatives, as if those alterna-
tives were plain to everyone (see, for example, Clarke and 
Felson 1993; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). SAT, alternate-
ly, argues that before the process of choice a person engages 
in a process of perception by which he/she identi!es viable 
alternatives for responding to a temptation or provocation.
To perceive violence as a viable alternative a person needs 
to be willing to intentionally harm others – he/she must not 
think intentionally harming others is wrong in the particu-
lar setting, or care very strongly about doing so even if it is. 
.at setting must present factors which tempt or provoke 
him/her to intentionally harm others. .e interaction 
between such an actor and setting will determine whether 
that actor is motivated to commit an act of violence. 
2.1.1. Action-relevant Moral Rules and Values
Acts of violence are generally regulated (rule-bound) to some 
extent; even in circumstances where violence is permitted 
it is typically limited to certain actors and certain actions. 
We previously gave the example of sporting events such as 
boxing; other circumstances in which intentionally causing 
physical harm to others may be permitted include war, medi-
cal procedures and self-defence. To avoid misunderstanding, 
we reiterate that we do not make assertions about whether in-
tentionally causing physical harm to others should or should 
not be permitted in these (or any other) circumstances; we 
regard any action which follows or breaks the rules which 
regulate that action as moral action, regardless of whether 
those rules are de!ned by law or other codes of conduct, such 
as rules of professional practice (see footnote 1).
In circumstances in which violence is permitted, rules typi-
cally regulate who is allowed to intentionally harm whom. 
.is is true in the boxing arena, where the boxers are per-
mitted to intentionally harm each other (but not the referee, 
trainers, spectators, etc.); in war, where soldiers are only 
permitted to harm enemy soldiers (but not one another, or 
aid workers, or civilians);11 in certain medical procedures, 
where a doctor is permitted to intentionally harm only 
legitimate patients (according to strict legal and professional 
rules); and in cases of self-defence, where a victim can 
intentionally harm his/her assailant (but not bystanders). 
At the same time, during a boxing match referees, trainers 
and spectators are not permitted to hit each other or either 
boxer; aid workers and civilians are not permitted to harm 
each other; patients are not permitted to intentionally harm 
their doctors; and, of course, assailants are not supposed to 
harm their victims.
An interesting and relevant phenomenon is the monopoly of 
violence, which generally refers to the fact that an author-
ity !gure or group is permitted to use violence more freely 
11 .is is regulated, for example, by international 
treaties such as the Geneva Conventions.
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than subordinate !gures or groups. Governments o/en 
have a monopoly on violence in their power to regulate mil-
itary activities, police conduct and the use of violence by the 
criminal justice system (e.g., capital and corporal punish-
ment). In most western societies, governments are endowed 
with this power in order to protect their citizens. In some 
societies, however, it is assumed by the government (or a 
dictator) in order to control its citizens. In these contrasting 
cultures, rules about the use of violence in di#erent settings 
will di#er signi!cantly, and have very di#erent implications 
for its expression.
Alongside rules regulating who may intentionally harm 
whom are rules regulating what forms of violence may be 
used and what degree of each form is permissible. In box-
ing, only certain blows are permitted to certain parts of the 
body; in fencing one can be banned from a competition for 
hitting an opponent too hard or engaging in impermissible 
violent actions like throwing one’s weapon or one’s mask. In 
war the degree of violence is regulated by rules of engage-
ment, while the form of violence is regulated by the kinds 
of weapons and assault tactics which soldiers are trained 
and allowed to use (this is regulated, for example, by treaties 
such as the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Protocols, 
although not all regimes accept or apply these rules). In 
medical practice one can intentionally harm someone to the 
degree that it will ultimately help him/her, and this will take 
the form of speci!c (highly regulated) procedures. Finally, 
in the case of self-defence the form and degree of violence 
permitted is determined by need; one is generally expected 
to in0ict intentional harm only to the extent necessary to 
protect oneself. 
It is possible that this di#erential permissibility may impact 
people’s general violence-relevant moral rules (internalized 
rules guiding their use of violence in certain circumstances) 
and emotions (their emotional response to following or 
breaking rules about the use of violence), their tendency to 
perceive violence as an alternative across many settings, and 
the consequent spread of violent behaviour between settings 
(contagion e#ects). .is may be counterbalanced, however, 
by the fact that there are almost always rules regulating 
who, what, when and where as far as violent behaviour is 
concerned. Whether or not one follows those rules will !rst 
and foremost depend on whether a person agrees with them 
(his/her personal moral rules) and cares about following 
them (his/her moral emotions).
2.1.2. Personal Moral Rules and Violence
People’s personal morality may be conducive to violence if 
they do not think acting violently in a setting is wrong, even 
if it is regulated, and if their moral emotions do not deter 
violence (they do not feel shame or guilt for acting violently) 
or even support it (they feel righteous or virtuous for acting 
violently). 
Many people, for instance, will accept that hitting some-
one is wrong (because it breaks a rule or has signi!cantly 
negative outcomes), but some will experience shame and 
guilt if they hit someone (or even think about doing so) and 
therefore feel particularly strongly that they (and others) 
should not do so. Others will not experience shame and 
guilt and will therefore attach less importance to hitting 
someone even if it breaks a moral rule and they think doing 
so is wrong, making them more likely to do so. Some people 
in some circumstances may even experience a feeling of 
self-righteousness – for instance, when they intention-
ally harm someone who has insulted them, their partner, 
mother, sibling, etc. – which will increase their tendency to 
see hitting someone as an alternative under those circum-
stances. Others, of course, may feel self-righteous when they 
do not hit someone who, for example, insulted them (etc.), 
strengthening their tendency to perceive not doing so as an 
alternative; many religions rely on this process to regulate 
their followers’ moral behaviour.
To perceive violence as an alternative, a person must not 
only have personal moral rules and emotions conducive to 
violence, he/she must also take part in settings which lead 
him/her not only to see violence as possible, but also propi-
tious.
2.1.3. Factors which Motivate Acts of Violence
For a person to undertake an act of violence he/she needs to 
perceive violence as an alternative which he/she is motivated 
to pursue. SAT suggests that once an individual perceives 
an alternative, he/she will be motivated to pursue it if he/
she believes that action will satisfy a desire or ful!l a com-
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mitment or address a source of friction. In the former case, 
he/she is tempted by an opportunity; in the latter he/she is 
provoked by an interference.
A person will be motivated to pursue an act of violence if 
he/she believes that he/she can acquire desired outcomes 
or ful!l commitments by intentionally harming others, 
and consequently sees opportunities to intentionally harm 
others as tempting; or if he/she sees intentionally harming 
others as a way of addressing a source of friction and conse-
quently is provoked to commit an act of violence.
2.1.3.1. Opportunities and Temptation
Certain people may have certain characteristics which lead 
them to (1) desire the outcomes of acts which intentionally 
harm others, or form commitments which can be ful-
!lled through intentionally harming others, and/or (2) see 
intentionally harming others as an acceptable method for 
obtaining those outcomes or ful!lling those commitments. 
Arguably, only these people will perceive opportunities to 
intentionally harm others as tempting. .e outcomes of 
acts of violence which people may desire include a range of 
feelings, such as power and dominance, physical prowess, 
justness or righteousness, daring, and legitimacy (having 
proved oneself); and the acquisition of desired e#ects, such 
as material possessions, vengeance, justice, the esteem of 
others, or the “right” to others (“winning” the girl or access 
to a group or gang), or safety or security (for oneself or one’s 
family, friends, gang members, etc.). Commitments which 
may be ful!lled through acts of violence include defend-
ing or establishing one’s group (for example, one’s family, 
one’s country, or one’s gang); upholding the honour of one’s 
group; or performing one’s duties to one’s group. Some 
people will perceive acts of violence as acceptable means for 
acquiring these outcomes or ful!lling these commitments; 
others will not, depending on their personal moral rules 
and emotions and the current circumstances.
Opportunities to obtain desired outcomes or ful!l commit-
ments through acts of violence need to be present in order 
to tempt people. Such opportunities require a potential vic-
tim and factors which suggest that harming him/her may 
achieve desired outcomes or ful!l commitments. Such fac-
tors will include characteristics of the victim which suggest 
that harming him/her may lead to feelings of dominance, 
legitimacy, etc.; characteristics of the circumstance which 
suggest that harming the victim is the right thing to do; the 
presence (or knowledge) of others who approve of actions 
which harm the victim, and the absence of those who might 
disapprove or interfere; and the presence of desirable objects 
which may be obtained by harming the victim.
2.1.3.2. Frictions and Provocation
Certain people may have certain characteristics which lead 
them to (1) perceive other people as sources of friction, (2) 
experience negative a#ect in response to sources of friction, 
and/or (3) see intentionally harming people who represent 
sources of friction as a viable alternative. Arguably, only 
these people will be provoked to intentionally harm others. 
People become sources of friction when they interfere 
with another person or that person’s course of action, for 
example, when a police o"cer stops a burglar from escaping 
the scene, or a drunk hassles a couple on a train. .e degree 
to which a person will be provoked by an interference will 
depend on his/her sensitivity (the negative a#ect he/she ex-
periences). Strong a#ect may reduce the perception of other 
alternatives by focusing goal-directed energies on address-
ing the source of friction directly. 
.e perception of other people as sources of friction may 
also be in0uenced by a person’s perceptual biases, i.e., his/
her tendency to interpret the actions and motives of others 
in a particular way. One of the most popular and relevant 
perceptual biases is the hostile attribution bias, which leads 
a person to interpret the actions and motives of others as 
inherently antagonistic (Dodge and Crick 1990). A person 
with this bias may be more likely to perceive the actions of 
others as intentional interferences.
.e negative a#ect associated with friction is consistent 
with the concept of frustration within the familiar “frustra-
tion-aggression hypothesis” (Dollard et al. 1944). However, 
not all aggressive, or violent, actions are motivated by fric-
tion (provoked) Some people have weak enough violence-
relevant morality that they see nothing wrong with acting 
violently in a given setting, and therefore do not need strong 
emotions to motivate them to do so. In this case, it may be 
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a lack of strong emotions (i.e., guilt and shame) which leads 
to aggression.
2.1.4. Motivation and Instrumental vs. Expressive Acts of Violence
.e motivation to commit either expressive or instrumental 
acts of violence is explicable within this framework. People 
may be tempted or provoked to use violence expressively, 
i.e., with the express desire to harm someone, or instrumen-
tally, i.e., as a tool to obtain outcomes other than the harm 
itself (for example, material items, group access, etc.). 
People may be motivated to exhibit instrumental violence 
when they are tempted by opportunities to gain desired 
outcomes or ful!l commitments, or provoked to address 
sources of friction, through the use of violence. For exam-
ple, a person might be motivated to kill someone to obtain 
an inheritance, or to ful!l a commitment to his/her partner 
(who desires the inheritance). People may be motivated to 
exhibit expressive violence when they perceive opportuni-
ties to cause intentional harm to others as tempting or when 
a source of friction provokes them to see harming someone 
as desirable. For example, a man might hit his wife to feel in 
control, or his daughter to punish her because she knocks 
over his beer.
Most provocations which lead to violence lead to expressive 
violence, because harming the source of friction becomes 
the desired outcome. Greater sensitivity to friction increases 
the desire to cause harm to its source. Provocations will 
lead to instrumental violence when a person responds 
violently to someone who obstructs a course of action only 
if harming him/her is incidental to removing him/her as 
an obstacle to action. Greater sensitivity to reward, in this 
case, and insensitivity to the su#ering of others (lack of 
empathy), may maintain goal-directed attention upon the 
original course of action.
2.1.5. Emotions and the Motivation to Act Violently
Emotions are how people experience motivation, i.e., how 
people interpret the sensation of physically “gearing up” 
for action (the increase in heart rate, respiration, perspira-
tion, etc.). Emotions supplement motivation by signal-
ling whether a situational factor should be approached or 
avoided, how signi!cant it is to action, and what responses 
to it may be promising, risky or perilous. People will di#er 
in their emotional response to the same opportunities and 
frictions because they will di#er in the strength of their 
desires, sensitivity and moral emotions.
Emotion plays a particularly important role in violence. 
.ose who commit acts of violence are typically very sensi-
tive to conducive temptations and/or provocations, and/
or very insensitive to the consequences of their actions and 
relevant moral rules. Strong emotions evoked by an oppor-
tunity or source of friction may compel immediate action, 
encouraging a violent response and potentially a#ecting the 
perception of other alternatives by monopolizing attention; 
especially weak emotions (e.g., a lack of guilt or shame) may 
lead a person to neglect or disregard relevant moral rules 
and foreseeable consequences. 
Intentionally harming others may present a fast and e#ec-
tive way of addressing sources of friction, which may be 
appealing to people who are sensitive to friction and experi-
ence strong negative a#ect. People may become sensitive to 
friction if they have experiences which lead them to see fric-
tions as signi!cant, or perceptual biases which lead them 
to misinterpret frictions as signi!cant, and consequently 
experience strong emotions when faced with interfer-
ences. Such strong emotions may lead some people to break 
personal moral rules which oppose violence, or others to 
follow personal moral rules which support violence. Some 
people in some settings will see violence as the right way to 
deal with a particular opportunity or source of friction, and 
this may be supported by strong moral emotions (feelings of 
righteousness).
People who have weak moral emotions opposing violence 
may simply see violence as a useful tool for dealing with 
interferences, and no reason not to use it. Many political 
and social authorities, for example, utilize violence as a tool 
for dealing with the friction caused by people denying their 
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authority. Such violence may take the form of torture and/
or execution and will not necessary have a signi!cantly 
emotional component.12
Emotions play a role in the process of choice as well as the 
motivation to act by providing information which can help 
a person identify a preferred alternative or deal with con0ict 
between his/her motivation to act and his/her personal 
moral rules. Motivation, however, will determine the nature 
of the choice process; if one’s motivation to pursue one ac-
tion occludes the perception of other alternatives, a person 
will not need to deal with con0ict and the initial motiva-
tion (and relevant emotions) will prevail. Only if a person is 
motivated by more than one alternative will he/she need to 
take a#ective information into account in a more reasoned, 
conscious fashion.
2.2. Choice of Violence as the Alternative
Perceiving intentionally harming others as a viable alterna-
tive for action and being motivated to do so are necessary 
but not su"cient elements of the explanation of violence; 
once a person perceives the opportunity and is motivated to 
intentionally harm another, he/she must then choose to do 
so.
Situational Action .eory argues that two types of moral 
choice – habitual and deliberate – characterize all types 
of moral action. Arguably, then, acts of violence should be 
explained by either habitual or deliberate moral choices. 
People will habitually choose to harm someone (or not 
harm someone) if they see doing so (or not doing so) as the 
only action alternative. People will see violence as the only 
alternative when they do not see violence as wrong (i.e., 
when they have weak violence-relevant moral rules) and 
their motivation to harm someone is supported by strong 
conducive emotions (e.g., anger, righteousness) and/or 
not opposed by strong deterrent emotions (e.g., shame or 
guilt), and is not quali!ed by attention to other factors and 
alternatives.
People act deliberately when they consider more than one 
alternative for action; that deliberation takes the form of 
moral judgement when at least one alternative con0icts with 
their own morality (motivates them to act in a way which 
they think and/or feel is wrong). People will choose violence 
as the preferred alternative if they judge harming others to 
be the most e#ective, expedient and attractive method for 
satisfying their desires or addressing a source of friction, or 
if they are unable to inhibit a violent response even when 
they deem it wrong.
.e content of a choice process leading to violence will dif-
fer from the content of choice processes which lead to other 
actions mostly in the degree to which emotions and inhibi-
tion play contrasting roles. Because of the many formal and 
informal rules about the use of violence and their typically 
high degree of monitoring and enforcement, strong emo-
tional incentives are o/en needed to motivate a person to 
see violence as an alternative in the face of external controls 
(deterrents). Alternatively, very weak emotional commit-
ment to moral rules which oppose the use of violence can 
also lead to violent moral rule-breaking if a person fails to 
experience any con0ict between those rules and his/her 
motivation to harm someone. .is kind of violence may be 
referred to as psychopathic, because it is characterized by a 
lack of strong emotions (e.g., feelings of guilt and shame).13
Strong emotional incentives can be counteracted by strong 
internal controls (inhibition, i.e., self-control); here self-
control will play an important role in whether a person 
motivated to intentionally harm someone ultimately 
chooses to do so. A lack of emotional deterrence can also 
be counteracted by cognitive self-controls. Hence the 
choice to intentionally harm someone, whether habitual or 
deliberate, depends substantially upon a person’s emotional 
12 .ose who carry out the act of violence may have 
a stake in the authority being denied, but are o/en 
not the authority itself. .eir actions, consequently, 
represent the ful!llment of a commitment to that 
authority, rather than a direct response to a source 
of friction. Violent actions which ful!ll commit-
ments may also lack a strong emotional compo-
nent, as the motivation to act is instrumental and 
not driven by an actual desire to cause harm.
13 We use the term psychopathic descriptively, 
as what is known as a psychopathic personality 
or psychopathic behaviour is characteristically 
typi!ed by emotional detachment or impairment 
(Cleckley 1976; Hare 1993; Herpertz et al. 2001).
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involvement in the violent course of action and whether or 
not he/she is capable of inhibiting, or compensating for, that 
emotional impetus and exhibiting self-control.
2.2.1. Violent Moral Habits and Emotion
An actor will habitually choose to harm others if he/she sees 
doing so as the only viable alternative for action. He/she will 
see it as the only alternative if he/she does not happen to, or 
bother to, recognize other alternatives. A person’s emo-
tional response to a source of friction or temptation may be 
so strong he/she does not attend to other alternatives. .is 
type of violence may be referred to as reactive. Alternatively, 
a person’s emotional response may be so weak (because of 
his/her personal morality) that he/she does not see anything 
wrong with acting violently in a particular circumstance, 
and therefore does not look for other alternatives. .is is 
what we have referred to as psychopathic violence. Both 
reactive and psychopathic violence, in these forms, are also 
habitual.
While emotions, whether heightened or diminished, play 
a critical role in habitual acts of violence, self-control does 
not. Because habits involve the perception of only one al-
ternative, there are no con0icting motivations, and conse-
quently nothing to control. In habitual acts of violence there 
is no attempt to counteract strong emotions, or counterbal-
ance a lack of emotion with reason. Any “control” of ha-
bitual choices occurs during the process of perception when 
a person’s own moral rules and emotions lead him/her to 
perceive other alternatives, and/or deterrent factors, which 
refocus his/her goal-directed attention (the moral !lter).
2.2.1.1. Forming Violent Moral Habits
People form habits when they learn to repeat a behaviour 
in a particular setting (or type of setting) in which they 
regularly spend time. Acts of violence become habituated 
if a person regularly spends time in settings which present 
regular opportunities to act violently or regular sources 
of friction, and if he/she has weak enough relevant moral 
values to perceive those opportunities or frictions and 
!nd them tempting or provoking enough to disregard or 
discount other alternatives, in the case of reactive violence, 
or tempting or provoking and not inconsistent with his/her 
personal moral rules and emotions, in the case of psycho-
pathic violence. 
Young people, for example, regularly spend time in the 
schoolyard which, despite the best e#orts of school sta#, 
o#ers regular opportunities to act violently and/or sources 
of friction which may provoke violence. An adolescent 
may address the friction caused by being insulted by his 
classmates by hitting them. As he repeats this behaviour it 
becomes automated; he stops thinking (deliberating) about 
what to do when he is insulted and lashes out automatically 
(see Wikström 2006). He may also begin responding to 
insults by other people in other settings, or to other sources 
of friction, in the same way, leading to a contagion e#ect. 
.is habituation would be supported by somatic markers; 
if the adolescent regularly achieves positive outcomes by 
hitting his classmates when they insult him (for example, a 
sense of security, self-worth or even self-righteousness), he 
will develop a somatic marker which signi!es that hitting 
someone who insults him will have positive outcomes. 
Whenever he is insulted, this marker is activated and 
directs attention towards hitting someone as a favourable 
alternative. Because violence o/en has unpredictable and 
sometimes con0icting outcomes (e.g., di#erent degrees of 
victim resistance or retaliation, di#erent levels of physical 
discomfort, both positive and negative emotions), somatic 
markers may play an important role in how a person inter-
prets those outcomes as a whole – for example, how he/she 
deals with strong emotional and somatic information which 
may indicate stress, fear, anticipation or excitement. How 
the brain amalgamates this information will in0uence how 
a person evaluates, and what he/she expects from, opportu-
nities to act violently in the future.
2.2.1.2. How Violent Moral Habits Spread
.e more one experiences opportunities to commit violence 
and the more one !nds that violence satis!es a desire as 
expected, the more one will recognize opportunities for 
violence, even in di#erent settings, and the more one will 
see those opportunities as tempting. .is predicts an escala-
tion in the frequency of violence, and the spread of violence 
to di#erent contexts. Similarly, people who use violence as 
a means for addressing sources of friction caused by other 
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people (e.g., for “resolving” interpersonal con0icts) may be 
more likely to perceive violence as an alternative, and even a 
preferred alternative, across di#erent interpersonal settings.
Like other habits, violent moral habits may be speci!c or 
generalized. Some people might, for example, perceive vio-
lence as a viable alternative only when they are insulted by a 
particular person (a sibling or schoolyard rival), in a partic-
ular setting (outside but not inside a pub), or in reference to 
a particular subject (their appearance, romantic partner or 
favourite football team). .e more they habitually respond 
violently to these particular circumstances, however, the 
more likely they may become to do so under other circum-
stances. Such a scenario requires that they regularly spend 
time in settings which present regular opportunities for vio-
lence or sources of friction, for example, in which they (or 
their partner or football team, etc.) are regularly insulted. 
.is concentration of and prolonged exposure to opportu-
nities for violence and sources of friction may strengthen 
the salience and perceived emotional signi!cance of those 
opportunities and frictions, and potentially other opportu-
nities and frictions, in other settings. 
It is also possible for violence to become a habitual response 
to negative emotions more generally. For example, the 
negative a#ect associated with friction helps to drive violent 
habitual responses. Over time, those violent responses may 
become primed not only by a particular source of friction, 
but other sources of friction, and potentially negative emo-
tions in general. .is could be linked to more indiscrimi-
nate patterns of aggression.
2.2.1.3. Breaking Violent Moral Habits
Habits are broken by a salient change in the action context, 
such as the appearance of a strong deterrent factor, which 
refocuses goal-directed attention so that a person perceives, 
and considers, other alternatives. For example, were a 
person who habitually responded violently to being insulted 
to !nd himself insulted by someone carrying a knife or 
accompanied by a posse of older friends, he might consider 
alternatives other than violence. Violent moral habits can 
also be broken by changes in a person’s violence-relevant 
moral rules and emotions which lead them to con0ict with 
those habits, prompting the perception of other alternatives.
As violent moral habits may arguably facilitate, and per-
petuate, some persistent patterns of violence, understand-
ing how to break them can have important implications 
for intervention, possibly for some of the most serious and 
proli!c o#enders. 
2.2.1.4. Types of Violence that Might Be Driven by Habit
Certain persistent forms of violence may be driven by ha-
bitual processes, which may also have implications for pre-
vention. Types of violence which could be driven by moral 
habits would be actions which occur in a setting which the 
actor regularly takes part in and which consistently presents 
opportunities or frictions conducive to violence, and few 
deterrents. Examples include domestic violence, which 
occurs in a speci!c setting (the home) where the actor regu-
larly spends time, and which presents regular opportunities 
and frictions (via the presence of certain family members 
and social contexts) but few deterrents (is private and 
regulated by informal rules, many of which will be deter-
mined by the aggressor); and gang violence, which occurs 
in speci!c geographic areas (territories), presents regular 
opportunities and frictions (via the presence of fellow 
gang members, rival gang members and those “transgress-
ing” on gang “turf”) and few controls (is regulated by the 
rules of gang membership) (Wikström and Treiber 2009). 
Understanding the habitual processes and moral contextual 
features which drive these persistent behaviours may o#er 
new insights into how to prevent them.
2.2.2. Violent Moral Judgments and the Role of Self-Control
Although more conscious and reasoned than habitual 
choices, deliberate choices may still lead to acts of violence, 
despite the fact that in most cases violence breaks a moral 
rule. People deliberately choose to intentionally harm others 
when they judge doing so to be the best method for satisfy-
ing a desire or addressing a friction, or if they are unable to 
inhibit violent actions when they believe those actions are 
wrong. 
People may judge acts of violence favourably if they lack 
information about outcomes or other alternatives (e.g., 
because they lack experience or exhibit failures in percep-
tion), fail to reactivate and apply information (e.g., about 
their personal moral rules and emotions), fail to e#ectively 
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value information (e.g., ascribe appropriate emotional 
signi!cance), or fail to act upon relevant information (such 
as knowledge about whether an act is right or wrong). .ese 
all represent failings in information processing, either 
during sensation, encoding, retrieval or application. .e 
processing of information relevant to action is a function 
of executive capabilities, one’s cognitive ability to assemble 
action-relevant information so that it can be used to guide 
action. Executive capabilities support the exhibition of 
self-control by moderating emotional responses, directing 
attention, organizing information and delaying impulsive 
action. 
People who deliberately harm others may do so because 
they fail to take into account action-relevant information 
about other alternatives, or adjust misguided goal-directed 
emotions. For example, a gang member may assault a police 
o"cer who is interfering in gang-related activities, even 
though he knows it is wrong, because he fails to attend to 
the fact that the cop is armed, bigger than him, that he will 
feel remorse for his actions, that there are witnesses, etc. By 
leaving out such action-relevant details, the gang member 
cannot e#ectively plan his action and predict its outcomes. 
Applying this and other information to the action decision 
could help him reassess his urge to assault the cop and re-
direct those energies to other actions with fewer potentially 
negative consequences. Application of this information to 
the decision making process represents the exercise of self-
control.
2.2.3. Moral Choices and Expressive vs. Instrumental Violence
Expressive acts of violence are those for which causing 
physical harm to others is the desired outcome. People o/en 
see harming (or not harming) others as the only alternative 
because they have weak (or strong) personal moral rules 
and emotions deterring violence (respectively), or experi-
ence strong emotions which support (or oppose) an act of 
violence and override their perception of other alternatives. 
For example, a parent may hit her child because the child 
regularly makes her angry and she sees nothing wrong with 
addressing that anger through violence (e.g., feels no guilt 
or shame), or because she fails to moderate that anger. Peo-
ple o/en deliberately choose to harm others because they 
fail to e#ectively exhibit self-control. For example, a parent 
may hit her child deliberately because she fails to take into 
account relevant information about the moral implications 
and consequences of her action or to suppress her motiva-
tion to act violently.
Deliberate acts of violence in which the actor fails to exhibit 
self-control (here referred to as impulsive acts of violence) 
may be very similar to reactive habitual acts of violence – 
both are typically driven by strong emotions and lack con-
trols. .ese types of violence are more likely to be expres-
sive than instrumental, because reactive or impulsive action 
choices generally fail to take outcomes and consequences 
into account, and are therefore less likely to be focused on 
outcomes other than the desire to cause harm.
Instrumental acts of violence are those for which harm to 
others is a means of obtaining another desired outcome. 
Instrumental acts may be opportunistic and therefore 
habitual – a school bully may learn to beat up classmates to 
get their lunch money and over time cease to consider other 
alternatives for action. Instrumental acts may also be care-
fully planned – for example, an heir may murder his/her 
parents to acquire an inheritance, but undertake a sequence 
of actions to ensure the deaths appear accidental. .is type 
of action requires substantial information processing as the 
perpetrator “problem-solves” how best to remove a source 
of friction or obtain a desired outcome. 
Premeditated acts of violence will almost inevitably involve 
deliberation as they typically entail sequences of actions 
which must be planned and o/en carefully considered. 
.ey certainly exhibit weak violence-relevant moral rules 
and emotions, and may exhibit a lack of self-control if the 
actor perceives con0ict between his/her actions, and those 
rules, but fails to act accordingly. As actions o/en involve 
elements of habit and deliberation, it is likely that many 
such premeditated acts of violence end in habitual violence 
when the perpetrator becomes so set on his/her course of 
action that he/she fails to perceive action-relevant deter-
rents, con0ict between his/her actions and moral rules, or 
other alternatives.
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2.2.4. Moral Choices and the Motivation to Act Violently
Opportunities to commit acts of violence to expressly cause 
harm or instrumentally acquire other outcomes may be 
limited, as they rely on transient factors like the presence 
and accessibility of the victim and a dearth of deterrents 
(which are o/en signi!cant in the case of violence). For an 
act of opportunistic violence to be e#ective it may need to 
be immediate. .is need for immediacy may feed into the 
action choice process, supporting a habitual and/or impul-
sive response, and is facilitated by strong emotions.
Opportunities may reoccur or can be recreated; violent 
responses to these opportunities can be deliberately chosen. 
.ese deliberate actions (or action sequences) o/en require 
planning and potentially the intentional selection of condu-
cive contexts of action.
Interferences generally cause immediate friction; therefore 
the motivation to address that friction is also immediate, 
and only immediately relevant; the emotional impetus will 
fade over time. .is may increase the motivation to act 
habitually, overriding perception of other alternatives. In 
some cases, however, the emotional response to an inter-
ference can be sustained (for example, by changing one’s 
desires), allowing the response to be delayed until it is more 
opportune. 
Delaying a violent response will always involve delibera-
tion, as it requires goal setting, maintenance and problem 
solving, such as the location or creation of settings in which 
the action will be opportune. A person’s moral rules and 
emotions will determine whether each sequential action 
leading towards a delayed act of violence is perceived as a 
viable alternative; arguably many such sequences will reach 
a point where the actor no longer !nds them morally viable, 
for example, at the point of following someone home or 
voyeurism, or even simply fantasizing about the act. If, how-
ever, a person’s moral values and emotions do allow him/
her to perceive each sequential action as morally viable, his/
her moral reasoning and ability to exercise self-control may 
come into play.
3. Violence and Moral Correspondence
SAT suggests that people’s actions (e.g., acts of violence) are 
ultimately an outcome of the causal interaction between 
their propensity (to engage in a particular act, such as vio-
lence) and their exposure (to a setting conducive to a par-
ticular act, such as violence). People’s propensity to engage 
in a particular kind of action depends on their morality 
(action-relevant moral rules and emotions) and their ability 
to exercise self-control. Exposure occurs when a person 
faces a temptation or provocation to engage in a particular 
act in a particular moral context. A moral context is de!ned 
as the action-relevant moral rules that apply to a setting and 
their level of enforcement. At any given time, people vary in 
their propensity and exposure and that interaction largely 
explains their actions. .us acts of violence can be seen as 
an outcome of the causal interaction between a person’s pro-
pensity to engage in acts of violence, and his/her exposure to 
environmental inducements to engage in acts of violence:
Propensity x Exposure = Action
.e principle of moral correspondence states that the more 
a person’s morality (moral rules and emotions) correspond 
to the moral context (its moral rules and their enforcement) 
in which he/she operates, the less likely he/she is to break 
the moral rules of that context. If a person is exposed to 
moral contexts which correspond with his/her moral rules 
(i.e., which uphold and enforce those rules), he/she is likely 
to abide by those rules, namely because he/she will not 
see breaking them as a viable alternative, and because he/
she is less likely to experience con0ict between those rules 
and his/her motivation to act. In the case of violence, this 
would, for example, mean that if a person thinks hitting 
his/her spouse in response to a disagreement is wrong, 
and lives in a country where hitting one’s spouse in these 
circumstances is against general moral norms and the law, 
he/she is unlikely to break that law because he/she will not 
see hitting his/her spouse as an alternative for action in 
response to a disagreement.
If a person is exposed to a moral context which does not 
correspond with his/her morality, however, he/she will be 
more likely to perceive actions which break the rules of that 
context as viable alternatives, and more likely to experience 
con0ict between those rules and his/her motivations to act. 
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In this case, he/she is more likely to break those rules. .us 
if a person thinks hitting his/her spouse is permissible if he/
she is provoked, even though it is against the law where he/
she lives, he/she may still perceive doing so as a viable alter-
native for action, making him/her more likely to break that 
rule. He/she is also more likely to be motivated to break the 
rule even if there are other alternatives, and therefore may 
need to rely on his/her self-control to help him/her act in 
accordance with the moral context. Figure 1 illustrates this 
interaction for the special case of violent action:
Figure 1: Situational context and violent action
Situational Context
Propensity
Exposure to Moral Context
Conducive to violence
Not conducive to 
violence
Conducive to violence Violence is likely
Violence will depend on 
the level of deterrence
Not conducive to 
violence
Violence will depend 
on the actor’s ability to 
exercise self-control
Violence is unlikely
When the conduciveness of a person’s propensity to inten-
tionally harm others corresponds with the conduciveness of 
the setting to intentionally harming others, the outcome is 
predictable; if both are conducive, the person is likely to act 
violently; if neither are conducive, the person is unlikely to 
act violently.
When the two do not correspond, the situation is less clear. 
If a person whose propensity is conducive to intentionally 
harming others takes part in settings which are not con-
ducive to harming others, the moral context is less likely to 
activate that propensity, and may in fact suppress it. If that 
person does intentionally harm someone, his/her action 
will be driven more from the personal than the contex-
tual level. He/she may, for instance, misinterpret frictions 
as antagonistic, and provoking, and fail to recognize the 
cogency of the moral context (the risk of being caught and 
sanctioned for intentionally harming someone). Deter-
rence will play a key role under these circumstances; the 
degree and salience of deterrent factors, and how a person 
perceives them, will determine whether he/she is externally 
dissuaded from breaking the violence-relevant moral rules 
which he/she does not internally perceive as signi!cant to 
his/her action.
If a person whose propensity is not conducive to intention-
ally harming others takes part in settings which are, factors 
in the setting may motivate him/her to do so, in which case 
his/her violence will be driven more from the contextual 
than the personal level. He/she may need to exhibit self-
control to act in accordance with his/her violence-relevant 
moral values, which are not reinforced by the setting. 
However, if he/she has strong moral values, he/she may not 
perceive intentionally harming others as a viable alterna-
tive even if doing so is opportune or he/she encounters a 
source of friction, and therefore will not perceive violence as 
tempting or be provoked.
If a person’s propensity and exposure, as posited by SAT, 
interact as shown above in causing him/her to act violently, 
changes in his/her violent actions will stem from changes 
in his/her propensity to engage in violence and/or his/her 
exposure to settings conducive to violence (Wikström 2005; 
Wikström and Treiber 2009). 
(Change) Propensity + (Change) Exposure = (Change) Action
.is suggests that to change (prevent) violence we need to 
direct our energies towards changing people’s propensity 
to engage in acts of violence and/or their exposure to moral 
contexts conducive to acts of violence. 
Change in propensity and change in exposure also interact 
developmentally; changes in exposure may lead to changes 
in propensity, for example, by changing a person’s exposure 
to relevant moral in0uences, or his/her habitual behaviour 
(by creating new or breaking existing habits). At the same 
time, changes in propensity may lead to changes in expo-
sure by leading people to take part in di#erent settings (i.e., 
through selection e#ects). Figure 2 illustrates this develop-
mental relationship:
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Figure 2: Developmental context and violent action
Developmental Context
Propensity
Exposure to Moral Contexts
Conducive to violence Not conducive to violence
Conducive to violence
Violence remains stable 
(person is likely to 
engage in violence)
Inducement to reduce 
the propensity to engage 
in violence
Not conducive to 
violence
Inducement to enhance 
the propensity to 
engage in violence
Violence remains stable 
(person is unlikely to 
engage in violence)
One of SAT’s most important developmental mechanisms is 
moral education. SAT argues that people acquire their own 
moral rules (and related emotions) by internalizing wider 
moral rules and their experiences with those rules (moral 
experiences), a process of learning which takes into account 
others’ responses to one’s actions and one’s observations 
of others’ actions, and their positive and negative conse-
quences.
If the conduciveness of a person’s propensity to engage in 
violence corresponds with the conduciveness of the set-
tings in which he/she develops, his/her pattern of violence 
will remain stable: those whose propensity is conducive to 
intentionally harming others and who take part in settings 
conducive to doing so are likely to continue doing so; those 
whose propensity is not conducive to intentionally harming 
others and who develop in settings which are not condu-
cive to doing so are unlikely to start doing so. In neither 
scenario will a person observe dissonance between his/her 
own moral rules and the rules of the settings in which he/
she takes part, which might trigger a moral “re-education” 
process.
However, a person whose propensity is conducive to inten-
tionally harming others who spends time in settings which 
are not will experience pressure to conform his/her pro-
pensity to those settings (by readjusting his/her own moral 
rules) potentially reducing his/her propensity to engage in 
violence. At the other end of the spectrum, a person whose 
propensity is not conducive to intentionally harming oth-
ers who spends time in settings which are may experience 
pressures which increase his/her propensity to engage in 
violence, for instance, temptations or provocations which 
weaken his/her moral resolve and/or self-control, increasing 
his/her tendency to perceive violence as a viable alternative, 
and/or choose it as the preferred alternative. 
Just as the contexts in which people take part will in0uence 
their propensity to engage in violence, that propensity will 
in0uence the settings in which they take part. For example, 
there may be certain personal characteristics which lead 
a person to take part in settings conducive to violence or, 
alternatively, settings which are not conducive to violence. 
.e unique role personal and contextual factors play in 
causing violence is, consequently, incredibly di"cult to 
disentangle. .ese selection e$ects are only just beginning to 
be unravelled. What is plain, however, is that both personal 
and contextual factors are important, and that they interact 
in causing acts of violence.
3.1. Causes of the Causes of Violence
Antecedent factors which a#ect the emergence and conti-
nuity of propensity and behaviour settings may be regarded 
as the causes of the causes of action. In the case of moral 
action, the most pertinent causes of the causes are factors 
which in0uence the emergence and continuity of certain 
moral contexts, and factors which in0uence the acquisition 
and stability of certain personal moral rules and emotions 
as well as the ability to exercise self-control. In the case of 
violence, the causes of the causes are factors which in0uence 
the emergence and continuity of moral contexts conducive 
to violence (those in which rules promote violence or in 
which rules prohibiting violence are weakly enforced), the 
acquisition and stability of violence-relevant personal moral 
rules and emotions, and the ability to exercise self-control.
Social environmental characteristics will a#ect the emer-
gence and stability of settings conducive (or not conducive) 
to violence. For instance, societies will vary in their general 
moral correspondence: the degree to which their violence-
relevant moral rules (e.g., their laws) correspond with the 
violence-relevant moral rules of their members; the greater 
this general moral correspondence, the less likely members 
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of a society will be to break its violence-relevant moral 
rules. 
Characteristics of the social environment, such as social 
cohesion, may a#ect the emergence of this correspondence. 
Social cohesion may be seen as the degree to which members 
of a society have adapted their personal moral rules and 
emotions to match those of the settings in which they take 
part. .e less people, or groups of people, adjust their moral 
rules and emotions to match those of the settings in which 
they live, the less they will become socially (and morally) 
integrated, and the more likely they will be to break moral 
rules. .us if a person emigrating to a new social environ-
ment does not value its violence-relevant moral rules (and 
does not experience shame or guilt when committing ac-
tions sanctioned by those rules), he/she will be more likely 
to perceive violence as an alternative for action, less likely to 
experience con0ict between his/her motivation to act vio-
lently and his/her own moral rules, and consequently more 
likely to commit an act of violence.
Social integration may be seen as the process by which a 
person adjusts his/her moral rules and emotions to corre-
spond with a moral context. Societies which pose obstacles 
to this process will display weaker social cohesion and, as 
a consequence, weaker moral correspondence and more 
moral rule-breaking. If a person emigrating to a new social 
environment integrates successfully, he/she will acquire 
personal moral rules which correspond with the rules of 
the settings in which he/she now takes part, and will be less 
likely to break those rules (for example, to commit a prohib-
ited act of violence).
Typically, di#erences in violence-relevant moral rules be-
tween social or cultural groups concern speci!c acts in spe-
ci!c contexts, such as whether or not one is allowed to hit 
one’s spouse or one’s children or one’s pets, take part in or 
watch violent sports (for example, bull !ghting, cage !ght-
ing), or the extent to which violence can be used instrumen-
tally (as in capital punishment, self-defence and torture). 
Di#erences in some of these contexts between cultures may 
lead to changes in behaviour as a person becomes socially 
integrated. In contexts which do not di#er substantially (for 
example, the domestic context) changes in behaviour may 
depend on more individual-level changes in awareness of 
and concurrence with violence-relevant moral rules.
.is highlights the question of the impact of rules which 
permit (or even condone) violence in certain contexts on 
the general acceptance of violence in a society or culture, 
and the slackening of moral rules restricting violence in 
other contexts. One might envision a contagion e#ect 
whereby acts of violence became less and less supervised 
across contexts; this is the kind of e#ect suggested by 
theories which posit that violent actions may be in0uenced 
by violent movies, television programmes, computer games 
and rock music.
Changes in the social environments to which people are 
exposed (e.g., political, economic and social changes) may 
a#ect the kinds of moral contexts present in a society, the 
degree to which certain groups of people are exposed to 
certain moral contexts, their moral correspondence and, 
consequently, the rate of moral rule-breaking. Changes 
in the social environment which a#ect the distribution of 
settings conducive to violence may a#ect who encounters 
those settings, and consequently impact the general moral 
correspondence and rates of violence. In the short term, 
changes in the rate of violence may be due to changes in 
the interactions between certain people and certain moral 
contexts which lead to changes in their violence-relevant 
perception–choice processes, such as the breaking of old 
and the acquisition of new moral habits. In the longer term, 
change may occur due to changes in moral educational 
in0uences which a#ect people’s personal moral rules and 
emotions, leading to changes in their violence-relevant 
perception–choice processes, such as their perception of 
violence as a viable alternative.
Changing levels of violence in a society is ultimately a 
question of changing the moral contexts (violence-relevant 
moral rules and their enforcements) which characterise 
the settings in which people develop (propensities) and act 
(encounter exposures).
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that a general theory of 
violence is indeed possible. Violence, we have submitted, 
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can be understood as a kind of moral action, and therefore 
can be explained as such. We presented a general theory of 
moral action (Situational Action .eory) that integrates in-
dividual and environmental individual and environmental 
in0uences through the framework of an action theory. We 
then applied this theory to the explanation of violence. We 
suggest that Situational Action .eory provides a general, 
comprehensive and uni!ed approach to the understanding 
and study of violence.
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